INTRODUCTION
Near the end of the last Term, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in what is destined to become a landmark case, Matal v. Tam. 1 In sustaining a First Amendment challenge to the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act, the majority, per Justice Samuel Alito, reaffirmed a core principle of First Amendment law:
But no matter how the point is phrased, [the Petitioner's] unmistakable thrust is this: The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First found the United States nearest her ideals of a democratic republic, and that she could whole-heartedly take the oath of allegiance. . . . For the fulfillment of the duty to support and defend the Constitution and laws, she had in mind other ways and means. She referred to her interest in civic life, to her wide reading and attendance at lectures and meetings, mentioned her knowledge of foreign languages, . . . and she would conceive it her duty to uphold [the American form of government against attacks in foreign-language publications]. 13 The district court denied Schwimmer's application but the Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning quite sensibly that a fifty-year-old woman would never be called upon to serve in the armed forces, so her unwillingness to do so was immaterial to her suitability for citizenship. 14 After Olive Rabe 15 argued on behalf of Rosika Schwimmer, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. Justice Pierce Butler authored the majority opinion, writing for himself and five other Justices. According to the majority, Schwimmer had failed to show that her pacifism and lack of nationalistic sense did not oppose the principle that it is a duty of citizenship by force of arms when necessary to defend the country against all enemies, and that her opinions and beliefs would not prevent or impair upholding a First Amendment free speech claim.
9. Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 (Jan. 28, 1930) , available at https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:37509894$1i ("A person born into the wrong family-and choosing another wrong one when chance permits the selection of a new family-that seemed to be my foolish position."). Schwimmer is here using "family" as a synecdoche for "country" or "nation."
10. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 647 ("The Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, requires: 'He (the applicant for naturalization) shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court . . . that he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same.'").
11. the true faith and allegiance required by the act. 16 That Schwimmer was too old and the wrong sex under the then-applicable conscription law was of no consequence to the majority because "the word [pacifism] is also used and understood to mean one who refuses [to take up arms] . . . and who is disposed to encourage others in such refusal." 17 As the majority viewed it, "her testimony clearly suggests that she is disposed to exert her power to influence others to such opposition." 18 In other words, the majority suggested that Schwimmer might encourage others to resist the draft, making a tacit allusion to Schenck v. United States, 19 in which Holmes, writing for the Court a decade earlier, affirmed the conviction of a World War I draft protester-an opinion that Holmes's Schwimmer dissent is at pains to distinguish. In essence, the majority was saying that American pacifists caused trouble by persuading conscripted soldiers not to report for duty during the Great War, so there was good reason to avoid swelling their numbers by granting citizenship-and its concomitant constitutional rights-to someone who might engage in similarly subversive activities in case of another war. Given that World War II would erupt a scant decade later, and interwar Europe was far from politically stable, the majority's concerns hardly seemed fanciful.
Holmes's answer to the majority begins weakly:
Of course the fear is that if a war came the applicant would exert activities such as were dealt with in Schenck v. United States . . . . But that seems to me unfounded. Her position and motives are wholly different from those of [Charles] Schenck. She is an optimist and states in strong and, I do not doubt, sincere words her belief that war will disappear and that the impending destiny of mankind is to unite in peaceful leagues. 20 Phrased differently, Holmes rejects the district court's finding that Schwimmer posed the same risk as Schenck in case of war. Given Holmes's track record of giving great-almost blind-deference to the findings of the trier of fact, 21 this ex cathedra pronouncement about Schwimmer's motives and likely future conduct is a remarkable departure. These statements are best read as a rhetorical springboard for Holmes's broader objection to the Government's effort to penalize Schwimmer for mere opinion unconnected to concrete action, and he does so in resounding terms that only he among the Justices could muster:
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that principle with 16 regard to admission into, as well as to life within this country. 22 Here Holmes takes a giant leap by introducing three ground-breaking concepts. The first is that the Constitution has anything at all to say about the treatment of aliens-a view he had in the past rejected most vigorously. 23 Second is the assertion that the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought-a right nowhere mentioned. This, too, seems to contradict decades of Holmesian jurisprudence-slavishly deferential to majoritarian will 24 To some extent courts were bound by the choices of their predecessors; it was not generally the province of judges to "undertake to renovate the law." Even on those occasions when precedents gave no guidelines, a series of institutional constraints derived from Holmes's notion of majoritarian sovereignty limited judicial freedom. The judiciary, not being elected representatives of the majority, was [not] to substitute its views for those of legislatures. The judiciary did not necessarily protect even constitutional rights against legislative infringement. All individual rights, for Holmes, were ultimately held at majority sufferance. 29
Holmes's most famous articulation of this principle was his forceful dissent in Lochner v. New York, wherein he stated: "I think that the word 'liberty,' in the [Fourteenth] Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." 30 Holmes's Lochner dissent was emblematic of his philosophy: "He has always been prone to sustain legislation where it was not clearly unconstitutional." 31 Moreover, Holmes believed that a reviewing court was subject to an additional constraint, namely the findings of the trier of fact, and he exhibited such deference in a trilogy of First Amendment cases in the spring of 1919: Schenck v. United States, 32 Frohwerk v. United States, 33 and Debs v. United States. 34 These cases were brought by the Government under the Espionage Act of 1917 against individuals who spoke out against the participation of the United States in World War I. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed convictions in all three cases. In Schenck, Holmes announced the "clear and present danger" test, which we have come to understand as a highly speechprotective doctrine, but "it is hard to see how a clear and present danger test of any substance was there applied." 35 Indeed, "much of the language in Schenck is simply inconsistent with any satisfactory protection of speech." 36 Debs was equally problematic; it embodied "the dead opposite of any significant clear and present danger doctrine." 37 Frohwerk, which relied on Schenck, involved the publication of a newspaper titled the Missouri Staats Zeitung. There was no indication that the paper's editorials were directed 29 to individuals involved in the war effort or to those who had been conscripted for service in the military (as was the case in Schenck). Thus, the evidence that the editorials presented a danger at all, much less a clear and present one, was scant. Nevertheless, Holmes affirmed the conviction in a passage that demonstrates the extreme deference he was willing to accord jury verdicts:
But we must take the case on the record as it is, and on that record it is impossible to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out. 38 These three cases illustrate Holmes's early insensitivity to free speech. While Holmes is widely celebrated today as the father of the modern First Amendment, 39 he came to that view late in his career. Holmes treated the trilogy of speech cases decided in the spring of 1919 as nothing more than "routine criminal appeal [s] ." 40 While Schenck announced the "clear and present danger" test, Professor White notes that "Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, taken together, suggest that Holmes' 'clear and present danger' test was simply a restatement of 'attempts' language found in his earlier opinions . . . [and] did not significantly modify his earlier free speech jurisprudence." 41 To much the same effect, Professor Thomas Healy has noted: "In short, Holmes was in many ways the justice least likely to stick his neck out for the right of free speech -and for the Court's role in enforcing that right." 42 Holmes had not yet begun to use the First Amendment as a tool for protecting those who spoke out against the government.
That evolution came in the following Term when he filed his justly celebrated dissent in Abrams v. United States. 43 In Abrams, the Government prosecuted war protesters, this time under the Sedition Act of 1918, for tossing from the roof of a hat factory some 5000 leaflets calling for a general strike to protest U.S. operations in Russia. The Government claimed-and a jury found-that this was intended to impair the U.S. war effort against Germany. The Supreme Court affirmed, employing much the same reasoning that Holmes had employed in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. 44 Holmes dissented in sonorous language that set the terms for our modern interpretation of the First Amendment. And once he unlocked that door, Holmes stepped through it body and soul. canonization." 55 This was based on Holmes's grave concern that, with advancing age and eventual retirement and death, his reputation and the influence of his legal thinking would be lost and he would slide into obscurity. His friendships with younger intellectuals like Felix Frankfurter, Laski, and their contemporaries "made possible the channeling of his passion . . . toward the goals of a resurgent professional ambition. These goals precipitated judicial contributions that, thanks to the approval of his new friends, eventually secured Holmes the level of recognition to which he had always aspired." 56 Nevertheless, Holmes continued to feel "apprehension . . . about his friendships with the younger generation of scholars." 57 Thus, in "one letter to Frankfurter, . . . Holmes noted his 'rather fearful hope that I may never fall from the place you have given me,' and 'my expectation that always while I live . . . I shall have great cause to be proud of having counted for something in your life.'" 58 Holmes repeatedly expressed his ambition "to be admitted the greatest jurist in the world" 59 and "the greatest legal thinker in the world." 60 Given Holmes's insecurity and lofty ambitions, significant pushback on his spring 1919 speech opinions, from the very group of admirers that he was counting on to carry forward his legacy, might well have caused him to reconsider his position. 61 Finally, one must not underestimate the influence of Justice Louis Brandeis, the other brilliant mind on what was otherwise a mediocre Supreme Court. It was not merely that Brandeis courted and, presumably, flattered Holmes; 62 the affinity of two superior intellects trapped in a small-group environment with arguably lesser intellects should not be understated. I find it significant that Brandeis joined Holmes's three spring 1919 speech opinions, but they both did an about-face that fall in Abrams and worked pretty much in lock-step in speech cases thereafter. Professor Chafee posited the hypothesis that in the spring of 1919, Holmes "was biding his time until the Court should have before it a conviction so clearly wrong as to let him speak out his deepest thoughts about the First Amendment." 63 I find it more plausible that it was Brandeis who was biding his time: going along with Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs so as to gain his confidence, 55 then leveraging that trust to help turn the old warhorse around. There is little doubt that Brandeis eventually came to influence Holmes: Chief Justice Taft sourly complained that "Holmes was 'so completely under the control' of Brandeis that it gave Brandeis two votes instead of one." 64 Even if Taft was exaggerating, it is not difficult to imagine that a symbiotic affinity developed between these two great men so that they influenced each other to forge a bold new path in First Amendment law. Indeed, that affinity was on display in 1925, when Brandeis signed onto Holmes's famous dissent in Gitlow v. New York. 65 The Gitlow majority upheld a "criminal anarchy" conviction for publishing The Left Wing Manifesto in a radical newspaper named The Revolutionary Age. Holmes dissented, adopting a view of "incitement" that still resonates today:
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way. 66 Holmes had rounded another jurisprudential corner in defense of free speech. He had again invited danger; he had again flirted with the idea of free speech experiments; and he had again asked us to place an almost blind faith in his free speech enterprise. In the process, he became bolder. But just how far would that boldness go? Did Gitlow mark the end of the experiment or was there something more that needed to be added to the jurisprudential mix? SCHWIMMER REDUX Holmes's Abrams dissent brought him an avalanche of accolades from the intellectuals he admired, who then set in motion the process of canonization. 67 In the acerbic words of a Holmes critic, "[h]is very name became laden, through processes not completely secular, with connotations of concern for liberty; only with the greatest difficulty could he from that time on be seen as merely a man." 68 His collaboration with Brandeis also continued and strengthened, and the two Justices broke new ground-often in dissents or concurrences-in a series of First Amendment cases. According to biographer Sheldon Novick, Brandeis urged Holmes to write dissents in a number of these cases, appealing to Holmes's "sense of duty. . . . With each dissent he became more celebrated . . . ." 69 One can speculate on the "accidents of history" that brought together these two men of different "temperaments . . . [and] philosophies." 70 Brandeis, in full vigor of youth, was brilliant and methodical, yet lacked Holmes's rhetorical power and reputation. While Holmes was near the end of his career, he could still turn a memorable phrase and come up with sweeping concepts that fired the imagination. It is not difficult to accept Novick's claim that "Brandeis urged Holmes to write dissents, and Holmes did publish dissenting opinions more often than he would have . . . ." 71 There appears to be little doubt that Holmes wrote his Schwimmer dissent at Brandeis's urging:
[Mrs.] Holmes died on April 3, 1929, a few weeks after the oral arguments in Schwimmer. To help the grieving Holmes, then eighty-eight years old, Justice Brandeis spoke to his colleague about the Schwimmer case and about freedom of conscience. Talk of the case and the principle in it were therapeutic for the grieving jurist, or so Brandeis hoped. Thanks in part to Brandeis, Holmes rallied his energy and wrote a dissent. 72 As previously noted, writing the dissent posed some obstacles for Holmes because Schwimmer was an alien, and thus had no First Amendment rights, and because Holmes had to make findings on appeal, contradicting those of the district court. But these complications were beside the point because Holmes used his dissent to elucidate not so much a constitutional principle as a theory about the proper relationship between individuals and their government in a free society. With classic Holmesian terseness, he cut to the heart of the matter: "Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution that she thinks that it can be improved. I suppose that most intelligent people think that it might be." 73 In other words, proposing changes in the way we govern ourselves is constructive and necessary, and any government that prohibits expressing such ideas is courting disaster by stifling the process that enables society to adapt to changing circumstances over time.
Holmes takes pains to distance himself from Schwimmer's ideas by stating that he does not share them. 74 This is no doubt true, and it eliminates one possibility for his changed opinion-that he was simply favoring his own point of view. Holmes also points to groups like the Quakers who hold ideas similar to Schwimmer's and "have done their share to make the country what it is" and states that he "had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because they believed more than some of us do in the TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:523] teachings of the Sermon on the Mount." 75 This rhetorical flare reminds readers that Schwimmer's ideas are consistent with some understandings of the Christian faith, countering the notion that Schwimmer's views are the product of her atheism. But Holmes then goes a step further and proclaims that there is one "principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other": "the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." 76 With this last idea, Holmes announces that there are limits on the power of government that transcend even those expressly imposed by the Constitution. He, who so memorably sneered at the idea of substantive due process in Lochner, foreshadowed the idea of unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court would recognize in a later era. And indeed, in Girouard v. United States, 77 the Court overruled Schwimmer, citing Holmes's dissent and using language that endorses his view: "The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral power higher than the State." 78 The pre-Abrams Holmes might have cringed at this idea, but the Holmes of the Schwimmer dissent would surely have nodded agreement and perhaps even smiled.
Holmes's Schwimmer dissent has rightfully been criticized for being "devoid of any formal statutory analysis" (this was, after all, a case interpreting an immigration statute, not the Constitution) and for "substitut[ing] [Holmes's] views about the respondent and her ideas about the war for any sustained examination for what power Congress had actually delegated to the Naturalization Board." 79 But such criticisms miss the point: Holmes was using Schwimmer's case as a vehicle for explicating the concept he first posited in his Abrams dissent: "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas, . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and . . . truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out." 80 And, by applying it in a case where the speaker herself had no constitutional rights, Holmes may well have anticipated another important concept: The marketplace of ideas involves both speakers and listeners and denying Schwimmer her right to speak impaired the rights of others who might hear her ideas and benefit from them. The Supreme Court eventually recognized that principle in Kleindienst v. Mandel 81 when it allowed U.S. citizens to challenge the refusal of a visa to a speaker whose message they wanted to hear. 82 More importantly, there is the story of Holmes's ability to give birth to an idea, namely, that we should protect the very speech we abhor -speech that offends us, speech that aims to uproot the very principles we hold dear. Back then, the idea was bold, so much so that it was seen more as a rhetorical flourish than as a jurisprudential maxim. But, like so many other Holmesian ideas, in time it took root. Today, in case after case, it finds expression in our First Amendment literature, culminating in Justice Alito's opinion in Matal v. Tam, which elevates it to "the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence." 83 Offensive speech, hate speech, even lies have long received First Amendment protection. 84 But with the Matal ruling, the toleration principle became our "proudest boast."
Think of it: In less than 700 words, in his waning years as a Supreme Court Justice, at an age where most men were long retired, writing in dissent, Holmes managed to give birth to an idea that the Court eventually parades as an accepted principle-one to boast about. And perhaps this was his purpose. As Professor White has noted, "Holmes believed that when he left the Court he would surrender not only the power to work but the power of place; that he would then be subject to the vicissitudes of fame or obscurity; that others would determine his fate." 85 Or, as Holmes himself put it in a radio address on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday:
The riders in a race do not stop short when they reach the goal. There is a little finishing canter before coming to a standstill. There is time to hear the kind voice of friends and to say to one's self: The work is done. But just as one says that, the answer comes: The race is over, but the work is never done while the power to work remains. The canter that brings you to a stand still need not be only coming to rest. It cannot be, while you still live. For to live is to function. That is all there is in living. 86 Holmes's Schwimmer dissent may have been his way of overcoming his wife's death by, himself, continuing to strive, to create, to live. 87 88 In a letter to Laski in August 1929, Holmes reports: "I still get letters from lonely enthusiasts who shout over my dissent in the case of a dame who was not allowed to become a citizen because she was a pacifist." 89 In a typically curmudgeonly fashion, Holmes adds: "I told one of them that it was moral sympathy not legal judgment that led to his encomiums." 90 Despite his protestations, Holmes no doubt enjoyed his fan mail immensely. One can imagine no worse fate for Holmes than descending into obscurity.
Among his letter writers was Rosika Schwimmer herself. On January 28, 1930, she sent a two-page handwritten letter thanking Holmes for giving her hope, despite the unhappy outcome in her case. She stated that she had been advised, "You don't thank judges," but felt she had to write because she "carried [her] unexpressed gratitude as a moral debt." 91 Holmes responded in a letter dated just two days later. He first chastises her for writing to thank him and explains that " [a] case is simply a problem to be solved, although the considerations are more complex than those of mathematics." 92 However, he finishes on a warm note: "After which protestation, I must add that of course I am gratified by your more than kind expression, and that I thank you." 93 There ensued a correspondence between them that lasted, as best the record reflects, until 1934, the year before Holmes's death.
Because only two letters from Holmes and three letters and a telegram from Schwimmer appear to have survived, 94 it is difficult to tell the nature of their correspondence. Schwimmer seems to have written Holmes on various occasions, such as his birthday and retirement from the Court, but there are no known responses from Holmes. He did write a second letter to Schwimmer, acknowledging a gift of books and expressing delight:
I become a child again on reading them and sentimental tears drop from my eyes as I follow the boy chasing the rainbow or the youth of the other boys who followed the rainbow music. The law also is a rainbow, but to older eyes, and you have made
